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SECTION 14(E)’S CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT: SCIENTER V. 
NEGLIGENCE 
Edward Rivin 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing and important feature of America’s free, open and 
relatively democratic capital markets is the ability of individuals to invest 
in publicly traded companies. Although a public company’s management 
handles the company’s day-to-day operations and the board of directors 
makes the company’s major strategic decisions, the shareholders of a 
public company, as a group, are the real owners of the entity and its 
ultimate decision-makers. That being said, being a shareholder comes 
with certain rights and obligations that create a special relationship 
between public companies and their shareholder-investors. 
Arguably the most fundamental power that shareholders have is the 
ability to sell their shares; knowing when to do so has tremendous effect 
on whether a shareholder’s investment is profitable or not. Usually, 
shareholders’ best opportunity to sell their shares for a high price is in a 
change of control transaction.1  One common way a potential offeror can 
present a change of control transaction directly to a target company’s 
shareholders is through a tender offer.2 In this situation, it is a 
shareholder’s decision whether to sell his or her shares for the offered 
price. Needless to say, having all of the material information3 when 
making the decision whether to accept a tender offer is critical to a 
shareholder’s decision to accept or reject the offer. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“The Exchange Act”) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) more generally are the 
main federal sources of authority and regulation when it comes to 
 
 1. See the SEC’s “Change in Control Agreement” for a full definition of a “change of control 
transaction.” SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N., CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1283699/000119312510182910/dex102.htm (last visited Mar. 
8, 2019) (A “change of control transaction” is generally defined by the SEC to mean one of the following: 
“(i) A “change in the ownership of the Company” . . . (ii) A “merger of the Company” . . . (iii) A “change 
in the effective control of the Company” . . . or (iv) A “change in the ownership of a substantial portion 
of the Company’s assets” . . .”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Tsc Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“An omitted fact is material if there is 
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote 
. . .  It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a 
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual 
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available”). 
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protecting the rights of shareholders during a tender offer process.4 
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (“Section 14(e)”) was promulgated to 
ensure that shareholders have all of the necessary information to make the 
decision of whether to sell their shares for the offered price in the tender 
offer.5 Specifically, Section 14(e) protects shareholders from being 
materially mislead when making said decision.6  
When a shareholder feels that she was materially mislead by the offeror 
in such a way that she was deceived into selling her shares for an 
insufficient price, that shareholder has a private right of action under 
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act against either (1) the offeror or (2) 
corporation who issued a 14D-9 recommendation (hereafter collectively 
referred to as the “offeror”).7 
While much of Section 14(e)’s statutory language has been litigated 
and settled, as is discussed in Part II of this Note, some of Section 14(e)’s 
requirements are not harmonized across the United States Circuits. Within 
Section 14(e)-based litigation, the Circuit Courts of Appeal are divided as 
to whether Section 14(e) requires the plaintiff shareholder class to prove 
that the offeror acted with scienter8 in materially misleading the 
shareholders or whether the shareholder class needs only to prove that the 
offeror acted negligently in misstating or omitting material information. 
As will be discussed in Part III, the standard a federal circuit chooses to 
apply will have a profound effect of Section 14(e)-based litigation within 
that jurisdiction. 
This Note reviews the two possible burdens9 and why various circuits 
have opted to implement the burdens that they have chosen. Part II 
outlines Section 14(e) and explains its history and underlying purpose. In 
addition, Part II examines the previous rulings of various federal Circuit 
 
 4. See Legal Information Institute, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (last visited Sep. 19, 2019), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934#targetText=General,on%20which%
20securities%20are%20sold (“To protect investors, Congress crafted a mandatory disclosure process 
designed to force companies to disclose information that investors would find pertinent to making 
investment decisions. In addition, the Exchange Act regulates the exchanges on which securities are sold.); 
See also SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do (last visited Sep. 19, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”). 
 5. See infra Section II(A)-(B). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (holding that private rights of action are 
a “necessary supplement” to the Exchange Act and that "the possibility of civil damages or injunctive 
relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement" of the Exchange Act). 
 8. In its opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, n. 12 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court used the term scienter to refer to “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud.” Hence, it can be argued that the term “scienter” means something “more than simple 
negligence.” 
 9. The two possible burdens being scienter and negligence. 
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Courts on this issue as well as the progression of the Section 14(e) 
analysis over the span of the previous fifty years. Part II also discusses 
relevant United States Supreme Court cases and dissects the most recent 
decision in this area of law: the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varjabedian 
v. Emulex Corporation.10 Part III compares the scienter and negligence 
standards and discusses the practical implications of each standard, 
respectively. Part IV dissects Section 14(e) using various regulatory 
interpretation mechanisms. Then, Part V explains why the Second, Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits’ imposition of a scienter requirement 
is correct and should have been adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corporation. Finally, Part V explains 
why all public companies in America should hope that the Court grants 
another petition for certiorari on this issue and rules that the scienter 
requirement is the appropriate standard within Section 14(e)-based 
litigation. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 This Part provides an introduction to Section 14(e) and its purpsoe 
within the Exchange Act. This Part then provides a short descripton of the 
progression of how Section 14(e) has been treated by the United States 
courts by discussing relevant precedents from both Circuit Courts and the 
United States Supreme Court.. 
 
A. Section 14(e) Generally 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act11 are the two federal 
securities laws that have the most influence on communication between 
public companies and their shareholders. The Acts were promulgated for 
the purposes of governing securities transactions and ensuring 
transparency and accuracy in the financial markets.12 15 U.S.C.S. § 
78n(e), commonly referred to as Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, was 
added to the Exchange Act by Congress “for the purpose of regulating the 
conduct of a broad range of players who could influence the outcome of 
a tender offer.”13  
 
 10. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 11. Codified at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-78qq. 
 12. See generally The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, Securities Exchange 
Commission, (last visited Sep. 19, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html. 
 13. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 at 404. 
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B. Section 14(e)’s Purpose 
A tender offer is a high profile transaction that has been deemed 
necessary for regulation because it is one of two common ways of 
effectuating a change of control transaction.14 The second common way 
of effectuating a change of control transaction is through a merger that 
that shareholders approve. However, that merger is governed by the 
Exchange Act’s proxy rules and therefore beyond the scope of this 
Article.  
There are two common ways that an offeror solicits the company’s 
shareholders. The first route is through having the company file a 
Schedule 14D-9 recommendation with the SEC.15 The Schedule 14D-9 
recommendation is the step that wraps up the negotiations between the 
company and the third party seeking to acquire the company’s shares. 16 
Once the company is satisfied with the negotiated price per share, it will 
issue a Schedule 14D-9 recommendation statement with the SEC that 
supports the tender offer and recommends that its shareholders sell their 
shares for the offered price, which is usually at a premium. The second, 
more hostile, route of effectuating a tender offer is through a so called 
“hostile” or “unsolicited” offer.17 This route is chosen by a third party 
offeror when it either does not succeed in negotiations with the board or 
chooses not to negotiate with the board and elects to appeal directly to the 
shareholders.18  
Regardless of which route an offeror elects to take, the shareholders 
being solicited are entitled to all material information needed to make a 
decision to sell their interest.19 Section 14(e) serves to protect 
shareholders in tender offers. Specifically, Section 14(e) requires that 
offerors make their offerings and supporting documents not materially 
 
 14. Supra note 1. 
 15. See generally SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, § 240.14d–9, Authenticated U.S. Government 
Information, GPO (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2016-title17-
vol4/pdf/CFR-2016-title17-vol4-sec240-14d-9.pdf. 
 16. Schedule 14D-9, INVESTOPEDIA (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/schedule14d-9.asp#ixzz5PrZrwBgr (stating that “a tender offer is 
a public offer to buy some or all of the shares in a corporation from the existing shareholders. The SEC's 
definition: ‘a broad solicitation by a company or third party to purchase a substantial percentage of a 
company's Section 12 registered equity shares or units for a limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed 
price, usually at a premium over the current market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders 
tendering a fixed number of shares or units’”). 
 17. See generally Hostile Takeover, INVESTOPEDIA (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hostiletakeover.asp (stating that a hostile offer “occurs when an 
entity attempts to take control of a firm without the consent or cooperation of the target company's board 
of directors. In lieu of the target company's board approval, the would-be acquirer may then issue a tender 
offer,” or use other means to take control of the majority of the company’s shares). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Tsc Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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misleading in light of the circumstances under which they are made.20 
Hence, Section 14(e) imposes an obligation on an offeror to provide all 
material information necessary to ensure the shareholders presented with 
the offer have all of the material information to make a fully informed 
decision.21  
C. The Text of Section 14(e) 
While many of the SEC’s rules and regulations have clarity, others are 
subject to various interpretations and have been long debated. Section 
14(e) is one such rule. In relevant part, Section 14(e) states: 
Untrue statement of material fact or omission of fact with respect to tender 
offer. It shall be unlawful for any person [1] to make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading or [2] to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, 
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or 
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in 
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation . . . .22 
Although various uncertainties of Section 14(e) have been debated and 
resolved,23 one unsettled debate concerns the culpability requirement 
under the Section. Specifically, the question is: under Section 14(e), must 
the plaintiff shareholder class prove that the alleged violation was done 
with scienter24 or whether the class merely has to prove negligence on the 
part of the corporation. As will be discussed in Part III, the practical 
implications of these standards are massive. 
D. Approaches Adopted by the United States Circuits  
There is a split among the United States federal courts as to which 
culpability standard is appropriate under Section 14(e). Currently, the 
 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. (emphasis added).  
 23. See generally Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Whether the incorrect or omitted facts in a tender offer need to be material in order to 
sustain a Section 14(e) claim has been debated and resolved. The court in Commonwealth held that the 
omission of information in a tender offer does not in itself violate Section 14(e); rather, the misstated or 
omitted facts must also be material which depends upon whether reasonable investor might have 
considered them important in deciding whether to accept tender offer. Id.  
 24. See generally Scienter, The Free Dictionary (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/scienter (defining scienter as a state of mind often required to hold a 
person legally accountable for her acts). 
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Second,25 Third,26 Fifth,27 Sixth,28 and Eleventh29 Circuits all hold that, 
although not explicitly stated, a scienter requirement is present within 
Section 14(e). On the other hand, a recent 2018 opinion from the Ninth 
Circuit expressly parted from this interpretation and held that negligence, 
not scienter, is the appropriate culpability requirement in Section 14(e)-
based litigation.30 As will be described in the following subsections, the 
reasoning behind each side of the circuit split is founded on Section 
14(e)’s legislative history, analogies to other similarly written rules such 
as Rule 10b-5, and the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
similar rules and legislations. 
1. The 1970s  
The 1970s brought the first major cases to developed Section 14(e) 
jurisprudence. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.31 has 
been cited as the seminal case in Section 14(e) jurisprudence. In Chris-
Craft, the Second Circuit analogized the language in Section 14(e) to the 
virtually identical language of Rule 10b-5.32 Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:  
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c)  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.33 
The court noted that because of the parallel language and legislative 
 
 25. See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 26. See In re Dig. Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 27. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Flaherty & 
Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 28. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 29. See U.S. SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 30. See Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Negligence. Law.com 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2018), https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1314  (defining negligence 
as the failure to exercise the care toward others which a reasonable or prudent person or company would 
do in the circumstances). 
 31. See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 32. Id. at 362. 
 33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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intent behind Rule 10b-5 and 14(e), when determining whether there has 
been a violation of Section 14(e), the court will “follow the principles 
developed under Rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of such violations” 
to adjudicate Section 14(e) claims.34 The court further examined that the 
only notable difference between the text of Section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5 
is that Rule 10b-5 applies only to the purchase or sale of a security while 
Section 14(e) is also applicable to tender offers.35 Because of the virtually 
indistinguishable language of the two sections, the Second Circuit 
concluded that scienter is the culpability required under Section 14(e) just 
like it is required by Rule 10b-5.36 In essence, the Second Circuit used a 
purely textual approach to conclude that Section 14(e) requires a showing 
of scienter.  
In its decision, the Second Circuit made strong reference to Senate 
Report No. 510 that accompanied Section 14 when it was originally 
proposed.37 In regard to subsection (e) of Section 14, the Senate Report 
stated that: 
[p]roposed subsection (e) would prohibit any misstatement or omission of 
a material fact, or any fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices, in 
connection with any tender offer, whether for cash, securities or other 
consideration, or in connection with any solicitation of security holders in 
opposition to or in favor of any tender offer. This provision would affirm 
the fact that persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers or 
otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of 
the tender offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material 
information to those with whom they deal.38 
Based on this Senate Report, the Second Circuit reasoned that the 
legislative intent behind the addition of Section 14(e) to the Exchange Act 
was to make applicable to a tender offer the antifraud proscriptions of the 
federal securities laws.39 Following that reasoning, Section 14(e) must 
include a scienter component. In 1974, the Fifth Circuit endorsed the 
Second Circuit’s view that Section 14(e) was substantially identical, both 
in language and in legislative history, to Rule 10b-5 and therefore also 
 
 34. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 at 362. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. (the Court concluded that “[i]n determining whether § 14(e) violations were committed … 
we shall follow the principles developed under Rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of such violations. In 
short, we hold that a violation of § 14(e) is shown when there has been a material misstatement or omission 
concerned with a tender offer and when such misstatement or omission was sufficiently culpable to justify 
granting relief to the injured party. The key concepts in this formulation are materiality and culpability.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 37. Id. at 358 (citing S. Rep. No. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. Rule 10b-5 is a powerful antifraud provision. 
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required scienter.40 Since the 1970s, the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have all adopted a scienter requirement for the same reasons.41 
2. The United States Supreme Court Interprets Similar SEC Rules 
While the United States Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on a 
case involving Section 14(e)’s culpability requirement, the Court has 
issued opinions on cases involving similar SEC Rules that are useful to 
consider. The Court heard Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder42 and Aaron v. 
SEC43 in 1976 and 1980, respectively. The central issues in those cases 
were whether two SEC provisions, Rule 10b-5 and § 17, required a 
showing of scienter. Both of these Rules contain substantially similar 
language to Section 14(e) and are therefore useful in Section 14(e)’s 
culpability analysis. 
In Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court agreed that Rule 10b-5 required 
proof of scienter. The Court approached the Rule from a strictly textualist 
analysis. It noted that “the words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in 
conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10b was 
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.”44 In rejecting 
the SEC’s argument that mere negligence was the burden of proof placed 
upon a plaintiff shareholder class, the Supreme Court stated that  
[this] argument simply ignores the use of the words "manipulative," 
"device," and "contrivance" - terms that make unmistakable a 
congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from 
negligence. Use of the word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is 
and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities 
markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or 
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of 
securities.45 
Throughout its purely textual analysis of Rule 10b-5, the Court did not 
expressly reject the possibility of using Rule 10b-5’s legislative history as 
another supportive factor in reaching the conclusion that Rule 10b-5 
required scienter.46 Hence, the Court’s approach does not reject the 
 
 40. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d at 605 (stating “[the Fifth Circuit is] in accord 
with the Second Circuit that the same elements must be proved to establish a violation of either [Rule 10b-
5 or Section 14(e)] . . . Congress adopted in Section 14(e) the substantive language of the second paragraph 
of Rule 10b-5 and in so doing accepted the precedential baggage those words have carried over the years”). 
 41. See e.g. In re Dig. Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d at 328; Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 
F.2d at 430; U.S. SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d at 1297. 
 42. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 43. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 44. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185 at 197.  
 45. Id. at 199. 
 46. See generally id. at 185. 
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approach taken by the Second Circuit’s in analyzing Section 14(e)’s 
culpability requirement in Chris-Craft Industries. In fact, in Ernst, Rule 
10b-5’s legislative history impacted the court’s textual analysis. In 
addition to the reasoning above, in rejecting the SEC’s argument that Rule 
10b-5 requires only a showing of negligence, the Court stated that while 
a textual analysis that isolated subsections (b) and (c) may only require a 
showing of negligence, “such a reading cannot be harmonized with the 
administrative history of the Rule, a history making clear that when the 
Commission adopted the Rule it was intended to apply only to activities 
that involved scienter.”47 This lead to the Court reading the statute as a 
whole and not as disjunctive parts; consequently, the entire Rule was 
deemed to require scienter culpability. Hence, while the Supreme Court 
adjudicated Ernst & Ernst mostly on textualist grounds, it is clear that the 
Court also considered the legislative history of Rule 10b-5. 
In Aaron v. SEC,48 the United States Supreme Court analyzed SEC 
Rule 10b-5 as well as § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933.49 Using a 
similar textual and legislative analysis as the Court did in Ernst & Ernst,50 
the Court once again concluded that Rule 10b-5 required a showing of 
scienter.51 In Aaron, the Court took a novel, disjunctive textual approach 
in analyzing § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.52 After a short analysis 
of the text of § 17 (a)(1), the Court concluded that the section clearly 
required scienter because the language “‘to employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud,’ plainly evidences an intent on the part of Congress 
to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct.”53 In contrast, when 
read in isolation, the language of § 17(a)(2), which prohibits any person 
from obtaining money or property "by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact”54 is “devoid of any 
 
 47. Id. at 212. 
 48. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 49. § 17 is codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 77q(a). 
 50. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 51. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 52. Id. at 695 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 at 214, for the proposition that “if 
the language of a provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with 
the legislative history, it is unnecessary ‘to examine the additional considerations of “policy” . . . that may 
have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute’”). 
 53. Id. at 696; see also § 17(a)(1) which reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of any means 
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, 
directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
(2) . . . 
 
 54. § 17(a)(2) which reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
9
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suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement.”55 Despite arguments 
from the parties that urged the Court to adopt a uniform culpability 
requirement for the totality of § 17(a), the Court concluded that § 17(a) 
requires scienter under § 17(a)(1) but not under § 17(a)(2) due to the 
material differences between the language used in the subparagraph.56 
3. The Effect of the Supreme Court’s Decisions 
In the wake of Ernst & Ernst57 and Aaron,58 the majority of Circuit 
Courts, relying on their respective case law, continued to hold that Section 
14(e) requires a showing of scienter.59 Ultimately, these Circuit Courts 
interpreted Ernst & Ernst and Aaron as confirming their approaches to 
read Section 14(e) to require proof of scienter because neither Ernst & 
Ernst nor Aaron rejected their approach to analyzing the text of Section 
14(e). 
Most recently, however, the Ninth Circuit expressly parted from this 
view and held instead that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ernst & Ernst 
and Aaron support the opposite conclusion—that the culpability 
requirement encompassed within Section 14(e) is merely negligence, not 
scienter.60 The foundation for this conclusion was the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Aaron that recognized that, where an SEC Rule is clearly 
 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of any means 
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, 
directly or indirectly— 
(1) . . .  
(2)  to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading 
(3) . . . 
 
 55. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 at 696. 
 56. See id. at 697 (stating “[i]t is our view, in sum, that the language of § 17 (a) requires scienter 
under § 17 (a)(1), but not under § 17 (a)(2) or § 17 (a)(3). Although the parties have urged the Court to 
adopt a uniform culpability requirement for the three subparagraphs of § 17 (a), the language of the section 
is simply not amenable to such an interpretation.”). 
 57. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 58. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 59. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Chris-Craft 
Industries for the proposition that "[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that scienter is a necessary element of 
a claim for damages under § 14(e) of the Williams Act"); see also In re Dig. Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 
322 at 328 (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir. 
1974) to hold "[w]e . . . join those circuits that hold that scienter is an element of a Section 14(e) claim"); 
see also Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200 at 207 (citing 
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. for the conclude that "[t]he elements of a claim under Section 14(e) . . . 
are identical to the Rule 10b-5 elements."). 
 60. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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disjunctive,61 it is possible for one of its subparts to require a showing of 
mere negligence even though other subparts of the same Rule may require 
scienter.62 Using this disjunctive analysis, the Ninth Circuit split the first 
sentence of Section 14(e) into its two natural parts.63 As a result, the first 
subpart read: 
[It shall be unlawful for any person] to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading . . ..64 
The second subpart read: 
[It shall be unlawful for any person] to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, 
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer . . ..65 
After splitting Section 14(e) into these parts, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that “Ernst & Ernst explains that where Congress prohibited ‘fraudulent’ 
or ‘deceptive’ practices—as in the second subpart of Section 14(e)—a 
heightened showing of culpability is required.”66 The Court proceeded to 
explain that, by the same token, Ernst & Ernst stands for the proposition 
that “[w]here Congress used language banning untrue statements of 
material fact (or the omission of a material fact necessary to make a 
statement not misleading), a lesser showing of culpability will suffice.”67 
Relying on Aaron’s disjunctive analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
“[o]nly the second clause of § 14(e) contemplates a scienter requirement 
[because] Congress did not use the words signaling a heightened standard 
of culpability in the first clause of the statute.”68 Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that a suit filed under Section 14(e)’s first subpart 
requires a showing of mere negligence and not scienter whereas a suit 
brought under the second subpart of Section 14(e) does require a showing 
 
 61. Id. (Christen, J., concurring) at 412 (stating that an SEC Rule that is disjunctive—as shown 
through the use of distinct clauses separated by a disjunctive “or”—can encompass more than one 
culpability standard). 
 62. Id. (the Ninth Circuit cites to Aaron and states: “The similarities between the statute discussed 
in Aaron, § 17(a), and the statute at issue [in Varjabedian], § 14(e), are striking: both statutes include 
distinct clauses separated by a disjunctive ‘or,’ with one clause containing terms that plainly proscribe 
more culpable conduct by using terms like ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deceptive,’ ‘device,’ or ‘artifice.’ And both 
statutes have a separate clause more expansively prohibiting ‘untrue statement[s] of a material fact.’ See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78n(e). Because Aaron held that § 17(a)'s two clauses require different degrees of 
culpability, it strongly suggests the same is true of the two very different clauses in § 14(e).”). 
 63. Id. at 404. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 411. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 411-412. 
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of scienter.69 
III. WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
Forum shopping is a common strategy in litigation because it allows 
the plaintiff to pick a court where the law is most favorable to its case. 
The venue rules within the Exchange Act are relaxed, which consequently 
means that forum shopping is an ever-present reality in federal securities 
litigation.70 What exactly do attorneys seek in the perfect forum? Many 
factors weigh on an attorney’s decision of where to file suit.  
A partial list of reasons that could affect where an attorney elects to file 
suit includes: (1) a favorable jury pool, (2) a pool of judges that have been 
favorable to the party’s position in previous cases, or  (3) ease of access 
to crucial evidence or witnesses.71 On the other hand, there are often 
factors that are consistent throughout all jurisdictions and therefore are 
not considerations in the forum-shopping analysis. For example, within 
the arena of Section 14(e)-based litigation, regardless of where suit is 
brought, the plaintiff shareholder class will always be required to at least 
(1) meet the Rule 23 criteria72 in certifying its class of plaintiffs and (2) 
prove that the misstated or omitted facts in question were indeed material 
to the plaintiffs’ decisions to sell their shares.73 The listed factors are 
merely a few of the possible considerations in a plaintiff attorney forum 
shopping analysis.  
With all of this complexity, one important question remains: is there 
one consideration that significantly outweighs the rest and would 
essentially force a plaintiffs’ attorney representing a class of shareholders 
to strategically file a case in one Federal District instead of another? That 
consideration is favorable case law.  
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varjabedian,74 the case law 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78aa (“. . . Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title 
[15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.] or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title [15 
USCS §§ 78a et seq.] or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein 
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served 
in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.”). 
 71. Forum Shopping, USLegal (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/jurisdiction/forum-non-conveniens-and-forum-shopping/forum-
shopping/.  
 72. See FED.R.CIV.P. 23 (Rule 23 provides the criteria that a class of litigants must meet in order 
to be certified as a class. The criteria is widely known as imposing a rigorous burden upon the class. Rule 
23 requires that the class meet all requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements within 
23(b)).  
 73. See Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
 74. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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relating to Section 14(e)’s culpability requirement was similar across the 
United States Circuits. Due to the consistent application of the scienter 
requirement across the nation, the existence of a favorable case law in one 
particular Federal Circuit had no bearing on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ forum-
shopping analysis within Section 14(e)-based litigation. But now, the 
Ninth Circuit has added an overpowering consideration into the forum 
shopping analysis that has essentially created a de facto national standard, 
causing the Ninth Circuit to serve as a magnet for Section 14(e)-based 
federal securities litigation.75 As with any action grounded on the 
Exchange Act, the plaintiff shareholder class bears the burden of proving 
each element of Section 14(e). By not reading a scienter requirement into 
the first clause of Section 14(e), the Ninth Circuit significantly lightened 
the burden to be carried by plaintiff classes in future securities litigation 
founded on Section 14(e).  
But how has the burden been lightened? Comparing the two eligible 
standards makes this patently clear. The first option: the burden of 
proving that the offeror acted with scienter.76 This burden requires a 
plaintiff class of shareholders to prove beyond a preponderance of the 
evidence that the offeror, at the time of issuing its recommendation to 
tender, intentionally or knowingly issued said recommendation with 
material falsities or omissions.77 The second option: the burden of proving 
that the offeror acted negligently.78 To prove negligence, all that is 
required is to prove that the offeror should have known that its statements 
were false or misleading.79  
In essence, the Ninth Circuit’s parting decision has provided a 
tremendous incentive to file Section 14(e)-based litigation in the Ninth 
Circuit. This decision along with the relaxed venue rules involved in 
federal securities litigation combines all of the questions and strategies 
involved in forum shopping into one simple question: how in the world 
 
 75. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, No. 18-459, 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3733, at *10 (Oct. 
5, 2018) (Petition for Writ of Certiorari) (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s decision created a de facto 
national standard because all strategic plaintiffs’ attorneys will see that Circuit as a “magnet” for Section 
14(e)-based litigation because of the lessened requirements). 
 76. Scienter, Legal Dictionary (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), https://legaldictionary.net/scienter/ 
(describing scienter as “[referring] to a [offeror’s] mental state at the time [it] allegedly committed a 
crime”); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 at 534-536 (“Scienter is a confusing word because 
its most natural meaning–and the one often associated with it–is knowledge.  But the term is used, at least 
in the area of securities fraud, to mean simply level of fault.  A statement like “scienter is required for 
liability” often is meant to do no more than rule out strict liability.  In this form, scienter stands for a full 
menu of choices on the matter of awareness: knowledge, knowledge plus willful blindness, recklessness, 
gross negligence, or negligence.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 79. See The SEC’s Negligence Standard: What Is It, and What Does It Mean? (last visited 
February 23, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d636648-8867-44b8-b21f-
78b7748d28b4 (citing SEC v. Steffelin, No. 11-cv-4204 (S.D.N.Y.) (Doc. No. 1)). 
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do we file in the Ninth Circuit?  
Under the Exchange Act’s venue rules, the answer to this question is 
most usually met by finding any connection to the Ninth Circuit (i.e. 
California). The enormous amount of business activity in California 
makes this connection relatively easy to find. In turn, just about every 
plaintiff shareholder class in a Section 14(e)-based litigation would be 
able to satisfy the venue requirements in the Ninth Circuit and could 
therefore file in the Circuit with ease—a forum shopper’s dream!        
IV. DID THE NINTH CIRCUIT GET IT RIGHT? 
This Part analyzes Section 14(e) pursuant to the various accepted 
methods of interpreting statutes in order to answer which side of the 
circuit split has interpreted the Section correctly. These methods of 
approaching statutory analysis have been fundamental to courts’ analyses 
in hundreds of cases involving ambiguous statutes and regulations. The 
major methodologies that will be considered are: (1) the plain meaning 
rule; (2) investigating the Congressional intent of the Section; and (3) 
analogizing the text of Section 14(e) to the language of other similar 
regulations.    
A. The Plain Meaning Rule 
A purely textual analysis of a regulation’s text has been declared a 
starting point to regulatory interpretation by most courts.80 The final 
sentence of Section 14(e) reads as follows: “[t]he Commission shall . . . 
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices 
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”81 A plain reading of this 
sentence makes it clear that the Section delegates the power to prevent the 
acts outlined in Section 14(e) to the SEC. Paying attention to the end of 
the sentence allows one to see that Congress explicitly granted the 
described authority to the SEC in the limited situations where the acts of 
the offeror are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. Each of these 
adjectives is a way to establish scienter.82 Additionally, the use of a period 
 
 80. See United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Flores Rosales, 516 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2008) for the proposition that statutory interpretation begins 
with the plain language of the statute. If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, that meaning is 
controlling); see also e.g. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 at 197 (The United States Supreme 
Court performed a textualist analysis of Rule 10b-5 to interpret its ambiguities), Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 
680 at 695-697 (The United States Supreme Court performed a textualist analysis of Rules 10b-5 and 
17(a) to interpret their ambiguities). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 
 82. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, footnote 12 (1976) (the Court noted that the 
term scienter is used to refer to “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”). 
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after the first sentence of Section 14(e)—which outlines the prohibited 
practices—shows a clear separation between the prohibited practices and 
the SEC’s power to prescribe means to punish those practices. The 
separation suggests that the second sentence is applicable to each of the 
clauses in the first sentence. Hence, the plain language of the Section 
supports the conclusion that where an offeror acts without scienter, the 
SEC does not have authority to allow a private right of action to 
shareholders. This suggests that a negligent act is not grounds for a 
shareholder to bring a private right of action using Section 14(e). 
One fault with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Varjabedian83 is its 
failure to consider this final sentence of Section 14(e). Both Rule 10b-5 
and Rule 17(a) have similar language to the first clause within Section 
14(e), and therefore the Ninth Circuit’s references to said Rules were 
relevant. However, while the comparisons and references were strong, 
one crucial difference was overlooked by the Ninth Circuit: neither Rule 
10b-5 nor Rule 17(a)84 contains any sentence, clause, or subparagraph that 
explicitly states what exact practices the SEC has the power to stop. 
Therefore, Rule 10b-5 and Rule 17(a) are arguably more ambiguous than 
Section 14(e) which expressly limits the SEC’s power to prescribing 
means—in our case, a private right of action—to prohibit only those acts 
that are done fraudulently, deceptively, or manipulatively—all adjectives 
that impose a requirement of scienter. This major difference between the 
Rules and Section 14(e) was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit. Based on 
the plain meaning of the words and sentence structure used in Section 
14(e), the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was incomplete and consequently 
incorrect. 
Another error within the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is its misuse of the 
disjunctive approach. The Ninth Circuit’s decision relied on the Supreme 
Court’s disjunctive approach in Aaron, which allowed the Ninth Circuit 
to split Section 14(e) into two separate, isolated clauses and attribute 
different culpability requirements to each clause.85 There are distinctions 
between Section 14(e) and Rule 17(a), however, that make this 
application of the disjunctive approach inaccurate.86 First, unlike Section 
14(e) which is one comprehensive paragraph, Rule 17(a) contains three 
distinct subparagraphs. Therefore, the Court’s disjunctive approach in 
Aaron was more appropriate than the disjunctive approach used by the 
Ninth Circuit because it is clear that Congress intended for Rule 17(a) to 
 
 83. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 84. Another difference between Section 14(e) and Rule 17(a) is that there is no private right of 
action under Rule 17(a). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (stating that “§ 
17 (a) neither confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as unlawful.”). 
 85. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d at 406. 
 86. Rule 17(a) was the Rule at issue in Aaron. 
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be read semi-disjunctively because of the format in which the Rule was 
written, whereas that same intent can be said to be lacking within Section 
14(e) due to the structure of the text. Because the disjunctive approach 
cannot be said to apply to Section 14(e), all three sentences of the Section 
would consequently have to be read in uniformity and a requirement of 
scienter would have to be read into both clauses of the first sentence of 
Section 14(e). 
B. Congressional Intent Behind Section 14(e) 
Section 14(e) was introduced as part of the 1968 Williams Act 
amendments to the Exchange Act. To accurately understand the 
legislative intent behind Section 14(e), comprehension of the legislative 
intent behind the Exchange Act, the Williams Act, and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) is necessary. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 193487 is one of the most influential 
authorities that governs public entities. The Exchange Act created the 
SEC and vested in it the power to identify and prohibit certain types of 
conduct in America’s financial markets as well as various disciplinary 
powers to enforce the Exchange Act’s Rules.88 Pursuant to the 
disciplinary powers afforded to the SEC, the clear underlying 
Congressional intent of the Exchange Act was to protect the integrity of 
America’s financial markets in order to protect the public and ensure that 
citizens who elect to participate in the public market are protected.  
Although the Securities Act and the Exchange Act began stabilizing 
the reliability of the financial markets in the mid-1900s, the early 1960s 
were plagued with abusive tender offers and “hostile coercive takeover 
attempts.”89 During this time period, “the vast majority of shares were 
owned by individual shareholders, a fragmented and ill-informed group 
unprepared to exert their rights as shareholders.”90 Gaps in federal and 
state law lead to these shareholders lacking protection from the hostile 
takeovers of companies in which they held shares.  The 1968 Williams 
Act’s amendments to the Exchange Act were Congress’ direct response 
to this flood of abusive tender offers and takeover attempts.91 The 
Williams Act amendments were meant to address gaps in corporate law 
 
 87. Codified at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-78qq. 
 88. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#secexact1934. 
 89. The Williams Act: A Truly “Modern” Assessment, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/The-Williams-Act-A-Truly-Modern-Assessment.pdf. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/8
2019] SECTION 14(E)’S CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT 305 
regarding cash tender offers between publicly traded companies.92 By 
prescribing broad anti-fraud powers for the regulation of tender offers to 
the SEC through these amendments, 93 it is clear that Congress intended 
to heavily regulate public tender offers due to the high risk position held 
by shareholders in relation to the sophisticated offerors involved. Section 
14 of the Exchange Act was amended by the Williams Act specifically to 
ensure that public shareholders do not have to respond to tender-offer 
proposals without all material information in hand. This amendment is 
found in Section 14(e)’s broad anti-fraud remedy.94 
After the amendments to the Exchange Act, the volume of federal 
securities litigation increased drastically because shareholders had more 
abilities to file suit. To protect public entities, in 1995, Congress enacted 
the PSLRA as a check against abusive litigation in private securities fraud 
actions.95 Congress’ explicit intention in implementing the PSLRA was 
to promote uniformity among pleading standards across the nation’s 
circuit courts and to “strengthen existing pleading requirements.”96 The 
Act “unequivocally raised the bar for pleading scienter”97 during the 
pleading stages by requiring the plaintiff to "state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”98 In essence, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with 
“particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the 
facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant's intention ‘to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.’”99  
In relation to Section 14(e), Congress’ intent has been controversial. 
The majority of courts agree that Section 14(e) was designed to provide 
shareholders who have been presented with a tender offer a right to 
receive sufficient information about the details of said offer such that the 
shareholder has all of the material information he or she needs to make an 
informed decision.100 The legislative history of the Williams Act 
amendments, as described above, supports this conclusion. Senate Report 
No. 510,101 which accompanied the Section 14 amendments, also supports 
this conclusion. The report implies that Congress intended Section 14(e) 
 
 92. Mark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 
Geo. L.J. 1311 (1983), 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2075&context=articles. 
 93. Id. 
 94. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 95. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, syllabus (2007). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 321. 
 98. Id. at syllabus (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)). 
 99. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 at 194). 
 100. See generally supra Part II. 
 101. S. Rep. No. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
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to serve as a medium through which it could provide shareholders a 
private right of action against the offering party. This is seen where the 
Committee notes that the amendments to Section 14(e) were meant to 
impose a high burden on the offerors involved in tender offers in order to 
provide as much protection as possible for the affected shareholders.102  
The imposition of such a high duty clearly suggests that plaintiff 
shareholders should have a relatively easy burden to carry; this suggests 
that the appropriate culpability requirement would be negligence and not 
scienter in a private action. 
However, as discussed in Part IV(A), the last sentence of Section 14(e) 
appears to expressly contradict the intent implied in the cited Senate 
Report. The last sentence imposes a possible limitation on this protection 
to shareholders because it limits a shareholder’s power to bring suit only 
for those actions that are “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”103 Due 
to this evident contradiction, the intent extracted from the Senate Report 
is not dispositive. 
Because the legislative evidence accompanying Section 14(e) is not by 
itself sufficient to conclude what Congress’ true intent was in writing the 
Section, considering the legislative intent of similar security regulations 
is necessary. When analyzing the Exchange Act, it is critical to understand 
that Congress enacted the PSLRA specifically to heighten pleading 
requirements within securities litigation. That considered, it is evident 
that where there is uncertainty as to the pleading requirements that a 
certain rule or section within the Exchange Act requires, Congress desires 
that the default requirement be a higher standard (i.e. scienter).  
C. Public Policy Considerations  
In determining whether the scienter or negligence standard is better 
from a public policy perspective, the practical implications of both 
standards must be considered. In order to protect the rights of 
shareholders, Section 14(e) provides shareholders a private right of 
action.104 However, there have been many obstacles imposed upon this 
 
 102. Id. (stating that Section 14(e) “would affirm the fact that persons engaged in making or 
opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of the 
tender offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material information to those with whom 
they deal.”) (emphasis added). 
 103. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (The last sentence of Section 14(e) states “[t]he Commission shall, for 
the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed 
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”). 
 104. See Wulc v. Gulf & W. Indus., 400 F. Supp. 99, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973) for the proposition that a private right 
of action exists under Section 14(e)); see also In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (reasoning that a private right to damages under Section 
14(e) is a reasonably necessary means of effectuating purposes of the Exchange Act). 
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private right of action. A few of these obstacles include a burden on the 
plaintiff shareholder class to prove that the misstated or omitted facts 
within the tender offer are material,105 a requirement to prove that the 
shareholders actually relied on the misleading information,106 and a 
burden of proving causation.107 By imposing a scienter requirement, the 
courts are making it even harder for a shareholder to establish a cause of 
action. This directly conflicts with Congress’ implied intent within Senate 
Report No. 510108 because imposing a burden to prove scienter will 
decrease an individual shareholder’s ability to plead the cause of action 
under Section 14(e) simply due to the lack of resources at his or her 
disposal to investigate the case to the extent necessary to prove scienter.109 
As a result, the only way to realistically seek remedy under Section 14(e) 
is through a class action. 
On the other hand, the listed judicially imposed obstacles align with 
the purpose of the PSLRA. Similarly, the imposition of a scienter 
requirement also achieves the goals of the PSLRA.  By imposing a 
heightened pleading requirement, the scienter requirement increases the 
percentage of cases dismissed and therefore protects public companies 
against abusive federal securities litigation by shareholders. This 
heightened requirement allows public companies to conduct business, 
including conducting mergers and acquisitions, without a constant fear of 
being held liable for negligence. It further allows public companies to 
admit that they made a mistake in the tender offer process without always 
being sued for negligence; consequently, this standard leads to a higher 
chance of transparency between a public company’s board of directors 
and the company’s shareholders.  
Contrary to this result, the negligence standard increases both the ease 
of filing suit and the likelihood of said lawsuits moving past the pleading 
stages which consequently imposes a large burden on the company to 
 
 105. See Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
 106. See Caleb & Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 599 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(citing Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973) reasoning that to 
properly state a cause of action under Section 14(e), a shareholder must allege (1) that there are 
misrepresented or omitted facts, (2) that the shareholder relied on those facts, and (3) that the 
misstatements or omissions were made with the requisite intent). 
 107. See Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (D.R.I. 1976) (citing Mills v. 
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) for the proposition that upon a showing of the materiality 
of omission within tender offer materials, a shareholder has made sufficient showing of a causal 
relationship between the violation and the injury for which the shareholder seeks redress). 
 108. S. Rep. No. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
 109. While this argument appears to be strong, it alone has not been enough to sway a court, 
including the United States Supreme Court, to conclude that a scienter requirement within other SEC 
Rules violates public policy. See e.g. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
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defend these lawsuits. To avoid these burdens, companies are much more 
likely to hide their mistakes which means that the shareholders are even 
worse off than before. Alternatively, to protect against claims of under-
disclosure, public companies will provide shareholders with so much 
material that the shareholders will have no idea how to sift through the 
provided material; as a result, shareholders will have a much harder time 
making a decision because they will struggle to find the material facts. 
Moreover, the negligence standard is also harmful to the public as a whole 
because it distracts public companies from pursuing their ultimate goals: 
creating wealth for their shareholders. 
Within federal securities litigation, the term scienter has been 
interpreted broadly to encompass any level of fault that is not negligent.110 
Therefore, the imposition of a broad scienter requirement strikes the right 
balance between protecting shareholders by allowing them to bring suit 
while also protecting publicly traded companies from abusive suits. It is 
also beneficial to note that the imposition of a scienter requirement has 
not been deemed to violate public policy when it has been required for 
suits based on other SEC Rules such as 10b-5.111  
For these reasons, the United States Supreme Court will likely 
conclude that public policy supports the imposition of a scienter 
requirement in Section 14(e)-based litigation.  
D. Balancing the Evidence 
There is strong, credible evidence that supports both interpretations 
presented by the circuit split. The plain language of Section 14(e) suggests 
that the approach adopted by the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits’ is correct. However, both the legislative intent discussed in this 
Article and the various policy considerations discussed herein can be 
interpreted to support either side of the split. 
Based on the fact that five circuits have considered all of the arguments 
set forth above and felt that the textual interpretation of Section 14(e) is 
the strongest influence as to whether a scienter requirement exists, it is 
likely that the textual approach will be eventually adopted by the Supreme 
Court. Additionally, the legislative intent and public policy considerations 
previously mentioned will also likely sway the Court to support the 
scienter requirement. 
 
 110. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 534-36 (1976). 
 111. See e.g Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185; Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
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V. WHAT’S NEXT? 
As of September 2018, the Ninth Circuit granted Emulex Corporation’s 
motion for a stay of proceedings pending Emulex’s filing of a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.112 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 4, 2019113 and oral 
arguments occurred on April 15, 2019.114  
In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Emulex puts forth various 
arguments that are worth examining.115 Emulex begins by pointing out 
that the United States Supreme Court has “frequently intervened to 
resolve conflicts over the meaning of the federal securities laws, in part 
because the flexible venue rules applicable to such suits mean that the 
outlier position of one circuit can become a de facto national standard 
simply through forum shopping.”116 Emulex argues that “[a]n 
acknowledged circuit conflict on a matter of such undeniable importance 
is a sufficient reason by itself to grant certiorari.”117 Emulex further states 
that if this interpretation of Section 14(e) is not addressed and reversed by 
the United States Supreme Court, Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. will only 
make the Ninth Circuit “more of a magnet for [Section 14(e)] actions.”118  
This assertion is correct. Forum shopping is a massive portion of 
plaintiff classes’ litigation strategy and favorable case law is a very 
persuading factor in deciding which federal circuit to file suit in. Emulex 
continues: 
[t]he Ninth Circuit, and northern California in particular, is home to one of 
the Nation's hotbeds of corporate startups that present attractive acquisition 
targets. And even if they are not based in the Ninth Circuit, most publicly 
traded companies at the very least transact business there. Accordingly, 
almost every merger that is subject to the securities laws can be challenged 
in the Ninth Circuit. And now that the Ninth Circuit has embraced a 
negligence standard for damages claims that the Second and Third Circuits 
(and every other circuit to have weighed in) has rejected, there is every 
reason to believe that they will be challenged there.119  
These facts, in combination with the relatively simple venue 
 
 112. Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., No. 16-55088, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26170 (9th Cir. Sep. 14, 
2018). 
 113. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 202 L.Ed.2d 511 (U.S. 2019). 
 114. The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on April 15, 2019.  
 115. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, No. 18-459, 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3733, at *1 (Oct. 5, 
2018) (Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
 116. Id. at *3. 
 117. Id.; see also Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp., 888 F.3d 399 at 409 (the Ninth Circuit expressly 
acknowledged that its decision was “part[ing] ways from . . . five other circuits”). 
 118. Emulex Corp., 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3733 at *3.  
 119. Id. at *23 (emphasis added). 
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requirements imposed by the Exchange Act, lead to the conclusion that 
every remotely strategic plaintiff’s attorney will seek a way—and will 
almost certainly find a way—to file in the Ninth Circuit in order to take 
advantage of the easier negligence standard. Hence, Emulex is absolutely 
correct in concluding that the Ninth Circuit in effect has created a new 
“de facto national standard” of mere negligence for Section 14(e)-based 
litigation.120 
Additionally, Emulex correctly asserts that the public policy 
implications of the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the negligence standard 
make it necessary for the United States Supreme Court to intervene. 
Emulex argues that public policy rationale is supportive of a scienter 
standard, not a negligence standard. It states that under the Ninth Circuit’s 
negligence standard, 
[c]ompanies and their directors will now be exposed to a much greater 
threat of abusive litigation and will have to grapple with whether any 
corrective disclosures will be read as admissions of negligence that subject 
them to backward-looking liability--likely restricting the flow of 
information into the market. That is precisely the opposite of what Section 
14(e) was intended to accomplish.121 
Again, this point is clearly correct and in line with the legislative 
history and purpose of Section 14(e). Emulex also correctly points out 
that the negligence standard will be more harmful than helpful to both 
businesses and shareholders because the threat of expensive and drawn 
out litigation will put significant pressure on companies to either (1) cover 
up their mistakes, (2) settle potentially weak lawsuits,122 or (3) disclose 
so much material that shareholders are flooded with information and are 
unable to make an informed decision because of the over-disclosure. 
Emulex makes extremely strong points in its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. However, to the dismay of 
both Emulex and businesses across the country, the Supreme Court, in a 
per curiam opinion dated April 23, 2019, dismissed the writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted.123 After the issuance of this slip opinion, the 
circuit split will remain in place until the Court grants certiorari in another 
case. Consequently, there will certainly be a surge of Section 14(e) based 
class actions filed in the Ninth Circuit.  
All businesses should be hopeful that the Court agrees to grant 
certiorari in another case addressing this issue and settles the circuit split 
in favor of the scienter standard; otherwise, offerors from around the 
 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. Id.  at *24. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 587 U. S. ____ (2019).  
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/8
2019] SECTION 14(E)’S CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT 311 
country will continue to be dragged into the Ninth Circuit to defend 
lawsuits that, before Emulex, had never before passed the pleading stages. 
It is now left to the defense attorneys to discern why the Court dismissed 
Emulex’s petition for certiorari and find a model case that will force the 
Court to shed light on what the right balance within Section 14(e) is: a 
requirement of scienter or negligence. For all of the reasons discussed in 
this Article, when that case comes, the Court should find that scienter, not 
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